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	 24		 What	now	becomes	important	to	consider	is	that	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	as	Houk	presents	them	are	preeminently	about	the	temporal	dynamics	of	the	bonding.	So	the	grasping	together	in	a	single	thought	is	the	grasping	together	of	a	development	in	time	as	a	single	thought.	The	question	is	whether	time	in	this	act	of	“seeing-things-together”	is	actually	important	to	understanding.	To	this	question,	Mink	answered	with	an	unequivocal	no;	and	yet	time	seems	to	be	crucial	to	Houk.	I	will	come	down	on	the	side	of	Houk,	but	first	a	bit	on	Mink’s	argument,	which	he	presented	most	forcefully	as	a	dismissive	critique	of	Gallie,	whose	stress	on	the	followability	of	a	narrative	he	thought	wrongheaded,	and	just	wrong.			 Understanding	a	historical	narrative,	according	to	Mink,	has	little	to	do	with	following	the	story	and	its	contingencies.	That	would	be	the	position	only	of	a	naïve	reader	who	did	not	already	know	the	ending.	No	historian	could	have	the	experience	of	contingent	events	being	made	acceptable	by	the	story	directing	them	toward	an	expected	but	open	conclusion.	“It	is	not	following	but	having	followed	which	carries	the	force	of	understanding.”	24	By	this	Mink	meant	that	one	understands	a	narrative	retrospectively,	not	prospectively,	for	it	is	only	in	retrospect	that	one	can	understand	the	significance	of	what	has	happened	at	any	point.	Furthermore,	it	is	only	in	retrospect	that	one	can	grasp	the	narrative	together	in	a	single	thought,	which	he	took	to	imply	that	the	temporal	order	of	the	events	that	it	incorporates	is	not	an	essential	feature	of	understanding.	The	“actions	and	events,	although	represented	as	occurring	in	the	order	of	time,	can	be	surveyed	as	it	were	in	a	single	glance	as	bound	together	in	an	order	of	significance.”25		This	conception,	with	qualifications,	has	much	to	recommend	it	for	the	Diels-Alder	simulations.	With	respect	to	figures	5-8,	for	example,	the	plots	of	the	
	 25	trajectories	of	bond	formation	can	literally	be	surveyed	at	a	glance	and	contemplated	in	their	entirety.	One	sees	the	whole	course	of	the	velocity	decreasing	through	the	transition	zone	and	the	full	shape	of	the	potential	energy	barrier	that	must	be	overcome.	But	does	this	capacity	for	retrospective	inspection	and	analysis	legitimate	Mink’s	more	radical	claim	that	the	overview	essentially	eradicates	temporality,	that	“in	the	understanding	of	a	narrative	the	thought	of	temporal	succession	as	such	vanishes”	so	that	“time	is	not	of	the	essence	of	narratives”?26			 Mink’s	most	extreme	formulation	of	this	claim	rested	on	the	idea	that	“the	human	project	is	to	take	God’s	place,”	where	God’s	knowledge	is	referred	to	Boethius’s	concept	of	the	totum	simul,	“in	which	the	successive	moments	of	all	time	are	copresent	in	a	single	perception,	as	of	a	landscape	of	events.”27	It	is	telling	that	Mink’s	references	for	this	notion,	with	respect	to	theoretical	comprehension,	were	Laplace	and	the	ideal	of	all-embracing	laws	of	nature	in	the	deductive	vision	of	scientific	knowledge.	That	is	of	course	the	vision	that	fails	for	complex	systems	and	for	which	simulations	from	models	now	offer	a	potent	alternative.	Even	with	respect	to	configurational	comprehension	Mink	took	the	timeless	totum	simul	to	be	the	highest	degree	of	comprehension.28	I	find	it	quite	difficult	to	reconcile	this	view	with	the	practices	of	those	simulators	who	model	the	evolution	or	unfolding	of	systems	in	time	as	their	source	of	understanding.	The	expression	of	this	unfolding	in	Houk’s	movies	provides	an	epitome.		
Temporal	Dialectic		I	do	not,	however,	want	in	any	way	to	undercut	the	retrospective	comprehension	that	Mink	so	effectively	highlights	as	synoptic	judgment	and	
	 26	configurational	comprehension,	quite	the	opposite,	but	rather	to	interrelate	it	with	the	prospective	sense	of	progression	toward	an	ending	that	Gallie	articulated	as	followability.	In	this	I	will	draw	on	Paul	Ricoeur,	who	in	Time	and	Narrative,	gave	extensive	reflections	on	“Defenses	of	Narrative,”	including	those	of	Gallie	and	Mink.	As	one	would	expect	from	his	title,	Ricoeur	took	Mink’s	claim	“that	time	is	not	of	the	essence	of	narratives”	to	be	a	self-defeating	denial	of	the	narrative	form	itself	as	a	mode	of	understanding.	He	found	this	denial	actually	expressed	in	Mink’s	totum	
simul	as	an	ideal,	for	it	would	have	no	place	for	the	sequential	form	of	narrative,	or	emplotment,	to	connect	together	the	complex	interrelations	of	the	world.29		Ricoeur	proposed	instead	that	narrative	always	involves	a	constant	interaction	between	two	dimensions	of	time,	which	correspond	to	the	emphases	of	Gallie	and	Mink.	It	involves	a	“temporal	dialectic”	between	an	“episodic”	dimension	(basically	a	temporal	sequence	of	events,	a	la	Gallie)	and	Mink’s	configurational	dimension.	The	plot	interrelates	these	two	dimensions	as	the	narrative	moves	along,	making	it	possible	to	follow	the	story	while	continually	grasping	it	together	in	a	kind	of	feedback	loop.	In	configurational	terms,	the	plot	“construes	significant	wholes	out	of	scattered	events,”	thereby	“eliciting	a	pattern	from	a	succession”	as	a	single	thought.30	But	episodic	time	is	not	thereby	abolished,	for	the	“single	thought”	encompasses	the	development	as	a	development	in	time.	Ricoeur’s	episodic/configurational	dialectic	can	be	captured	by	modifying	Mink’s	own	memorable	metaphor	of	two	views	of	a	river.	In	reflective	configurational	comprehension,	Mink	remarked,	“time	is	no	longer	the	river	which	bears	us	along	but	the	river	in	aerial	view,	upstream	and	downstream	seen	in	a	single	survey.”31	But	like	anyone	who	has	descended	a	turbulent	river	in	a	canoe,	Ricoeur	would	
	 27	surely	have	said	that	these	are	two	very	different	experiences	of	temporality,	and	that	their	interplay	is	necessary	to	understanding	river-time.	I	would	now	say	the	same	for	Kendall	Houk’s	trajectories	of	bonding,	as	well	as	for	snowflakes.		 The	Gallie-Mink	discordance	raises	a	further	major	issue	requiring	comment,	namely	the	role	of	contingency.	While	Gallie’s	forward-looking	perspective	welcomed	contingency	as	a	motor	of	historical	narrative,	Mink	viewed	the	historian	as	striving	to	eliminate	contingency.	With	respect	to	Gallie’s	remarks	on	the	complexity	of	causal	lines	leading	to	Sarajevo	and	the	inherent	contingency	of	what	happens,	Mink	responded:	“tracing	lines	backwards	is	exactly	what	an	historian	does,	and	there	are	no	contingencies	going	backwards	(if	there	were	there	would	be	no	lines).”32	Ricoeur	objected	to	this	reasoning	on	the	ground	that	historians	are	continually	rethinking	the	narratives	they	either	write	or	read	and	in	this	are	much	more	like	the	naïve	reader	than	Mink	allowed.	Thus	“the	process	of	tracing	forward	again	what	we	have	already	covered	going	backward	may	well	reopen	…	the	space	of	contingency	that	belonged	to	the	past	when	it	was	present.”33	I	would	argue	in	fact	that	it	is	precisely	the	job	of	a	good	historian	to	keep	the	“space	of	contingency”	open,	rather	than	to	close	it	down,	and	to	explore	the	possibilities	of	that	space.		It	seems	unlikely	that	to	“run	the	film	backward,”	as	Mink	suggested,	will	succeed	in	eliminating	the	importance	of	contingencies	in	understanding	complex	systems.	The	Diels-Alder	trajectories	and	movies	suggest	a	different	conception.	Granted,	running	any	one	of	the	movies	backward	will	take	the	viewer	through	precisely	the	same	movements	in	reverse.	But	every	rerunning	of	the	simulation	from	a	randomly	selected	starting	point,	mimicking	the	effect	of	contingencies,	produces	a	somewhat	different	history,	and	a	different	movie,	sometimes	quite	
	 28	different.	This	rerunning,	which	I	take	to	be	somewhat	analogous	to	the	rewriting	and	rereading	so	characteristic	of	historians,	is	one	of	the	important	ways	in	which	simulations	deepen	understanding	of	the	processes	they	model.		
Possibility	and	Exploration		 The	significance	of	this	rerunning	of	simulations	emerges	more	clearly	for	the	Diels-Alder	reactions	if	we	think	of	each	of	them	in	terms	of	the	whole	bundle	of	bonding	trajectories	that	represents	it	(here	standing	in	for	the	full	histories	that	could	be	shown	in	movies).	The	single	thought	of	bonding	then	encompasses	not	only	one	trajectory	but	all	of	the	trajectories	that	the	reactants	could	have	followed	through	the	many	different	randomly	sampled	starting	points.	The	effect	of	this	broader	comprehension	becomes	quite	striking	for	the	symmetric	reaction	of	butadiene	with	ethylene	depicted	in	figure	5	when	the	temperature	is	elevated	from	2980	K.	to	11800	K	as	in	figure	9A.	The	bundle	of	trajectories	is	now	much	more	tangled	and	irregular,	more	like	a	swarm.	A	significant	percentage	(such	as	those	stretching	out	to	the	right	along	the	bottom	of	the	plot)	go	through	a	different	mechanism,	an	intermediate	formation	(biradical),	which	leads	to	quite	long	time	gaps	between	the	two	C-C	bonds,	increasing	from	about	6	to	800	fs.	Movie	S3,	corresponding	to	one	of	these	trajectories,	gives	an	excellent	sense	of	why	they	are	so	tangled,	as	it	displays	a	dance	between	the	C-C	bonds	that	is	tantalizingly	long.	This	latter	mechanism	is	even	more	in	evidence	in	figure	9B	and	Movie	S5	for	a	different,	asymmetric,	reaction	simulated	at	the	lower	temperature,	with	time	gaps	over	1400	fs	(Movie	S5	at	http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2012/06/26/1209316109.DCSupplemental).		
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			 This	suggests	too	how	rerunnings	of	the	simulations,	as	represented	in	the	bundles	of	trajectories,	quite	literally	explore	Ricoeur’s	“contingency	space”	for	the	various	ways	in	which	the	reaction	could	proceed.	They	map	out	the	space	of	possibilities	as	real	developmental	possibilities	and	facilitate	the	grasping	together	in	a	single	thought	of	the	whole	process	of	bond	formation.34	To	put	the	point	a	bit	differently,	in	following	any	one	actual	bonding	history,	we	are	immediately	aware	of	its	place	among	other	possible	histories.	And	this	knowledge	of	the	possible	deepens	our	understanding	of	the	actual.	
	 30	An	analogous	relation	of	the	actual	to	the	possible	has	been	made	the	basis	for	a	penetrating	account	of	how	historical	explanation	is	related	to	understanding	by	the	philosopher	of	social	and	political	theory,	Geoffrey	Hawthorn,	in	his	Plausible	
Worlds:	Possibility	and	Understanding	in	History	and	the	Social	Sciences	(1991).35	It	turns	on	counterfactuals	and	on	what	he	calls	initially	a	paradox.	A	successful	historical	explanation,	on	Hawthorn’s	account,	connects	the	conditions	and	actions	of	actual	developments	with	other	actualities,	but	the	force	of	the	explanation	depends	on	its	implication	of	other	possible	developments	that	might	have	been	realized	but	were	not.		“Its	success	as	an	answer	to	the	question	‘why?’	will	turn	on	the	plausibility	of	the	reasoning	–	the	model,	mechanism,	or	what	J.	L.	Mackie	called	the	inductively	arrived-at	‘running	on’	–	that	we	invoke	to	make	the	connection.	The	plausibility	of	this	reasoning	will	turn	on	the	counterfactual	it	suggests.36	The	seeming	paradox	is	that,	in	connecting	actualities,	the	successful	explanation	opens	unrealized	but	realistic	possibilities,	and	it	is	just	in	this	opening	of	possibilities	that	understanding	is	located.	Houk’s	simulations	have	something	like	this	character.	The	credibility	of	any	one	actual	movie	or	trajectory	depends	on	its	place	within	the	entire	spectrum	of	possible	trajectories.	As	Hawthorn	said	of	history,	“It	promises	that	kind	of	understanding	.	.	.	which	comes	from	locating	an	actual	in	a	space	of	possibles.”	He	took	his	cue	here	from	Robert	Nozick	in	
Philosophical	Explanations	(1981),	who	suggested	that	“explanation	locates	something	in	actuality	.	.	.	while	understanding	locates	it	in	a	network	of	possibility.”	He	cited	also	an	astute	passage	from	Robert	Musil’s	Man	without	Qualities,	“If	there	
	 31	is	such	a	thing	as	a	sense	of	reality	…	then	there	must	be	something	that	one	can	call	a	sense	of	possibility.”	Things	might	really	have	been	different.	37	The	paradoxical	relation	of	explanation	to	understanding,	as	Hawthorn	presented	it,	began	from	the	view	that	historians	have	understood	explanations	as	providing	a	causal	account	of	a	sequence	of	particular	events,	an	account	that	aims	to	be	so	tightly	constructed	rationally	and	evidentially	that	it	is	irresistible,	explaining	away	contingencies	and	making	it	difficult	to	believe	that	any	alternative	development	was	possible.	He	summarized	this	view:	“however	the	world	may	appear	to	be	or	really	is,	to	understand	it	is	to	make	it	coherent.	The	coherence	is	ours	and	in	it,	the	loose	ends	of	mere	possibles	have	no	place.”	He	offered	a	paraphrase	of	Kierkegaard	that	recalls	Mink’s	view:	“Life	may	have	to	be	lived	forwards,	but	the	historian	is	privileged	to	understand	it	backwards.”38		Retrospective	explanations,	on	this	view,	exclude	the	counterfactuals	that	they	actually	imply	or	suggest,	for	to	every	cause	adduced	as	important	to	an	outcome,	if	that	cause	had	not	been	operative	the	outcome	would	have	been	different.	And	yet,	the	more	one	examines	the	particularity	of	the	apparent	causes	in	play	for	specific	situations	and	agents,	the	more	contingent	they	seem.	And	here	is	the	crucial	point:	“if	the	counterfactual	is	itself	not	plausible,	we	should	not	give	the	explanation	the	credence	we	otherwise	might.”39	So	even	as	the	pursuit	of	ever	more	detailed	explanation	hones	in	on	what	actually	happened,	the	nearby	possibilities	of	what	might	plausibly	have	happened,	but	did	not,	increase.	This	increase	is	where	understanding	lies,	it	“comes	from	locating	an	actual	in	a	space	of	possibles.”		All	of	this	seems	quite	pertinent	for	both	cases	of	simulation	that	I	have	discussed,	in	each	of	which	actualities	and	possibilities	are	produced	within	the	
	 32	same	generative	model.	Whether	for	the	whole	taxonomy	of	snowflakes	or	the	bundles	of	trajectories	for	a	Diels-Alder	reaction,	the	simulations	quite	explicitly	explore	the	counterfactual	world	of	realistic	possibilities	in	order	to	gain	a	more	thorough	understanding	of	what	actually	happens	for	any	particular	snowflake	or	trajectory.	Whether	in	history	or	physical	science,	then,	explanation	(of	actualities)	and	understanding	(of	possibilities)	are	inherently	linked.	A	better	explanation	is	one	that	makes	the	nearby	alternatives	more	immediately	present	to	what	actually	happens	in	a	given	case.		Interestingly,	if	unsurprisingly,	Hawthorn’s	analysis	of	explanation	in	relation	to	understanding	ultimately	vitiated	the	conception	of	explanation	that	originally	stood	behind	his	discussion	as	a	foil,	namely,	the	view	that	it	is	causal	laws	and	general	theories	that	explain.40	Drawing	on	a	number	of	philosophical	critiques	of	the	idea	of	laws	said	to	be	laws	of	nature,	or	laws	in	the	world,	he	proposed	to	“forget	laws	altogether”	and	to	focus	on	a	different	conception	of	explanation.	It	is	a	pragmatic	conception	emphasizing	relativity	to	our	interests	and	purposes,	and	it	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	“why?”	as	a	narrative:	“it	tells	a	story	which	is	guided	by	contrasts	with	what	we	want	to	explain.	It	succeeds,	where	it	does,	by	giving	descriptions	which	in	the	conventions	of	telling	that	story	to	that	kind	of	audience,	are	relevant	as	explanations.”41	In	Hawthorn’s	plausible	worlds,	context,	contingency,	and	indeterminacy	are	the	features	that	have	to	be	assimilated	in	our	understanding	of	the	story.	For	this	purpose,	it	is	not	the	distinction	of	science	from	non-science	that	counts	(or	indeed	I	would	add,	of	explanation	from	understanding),	but	of	the	actual	from	the	possible,	since	“each	turns	on	the	other.”42	He	could	offer	no	new	name	for	this	dialectical	mode	of	understanding	but	it	will	be	apparent	that	
	 33	it	bears	a	close	relation	to	Ricoeur’s	episodic/configurational	dialectic,	for	which	it	provides	a	grounding	in	the	logic	of	counterfactuals.			
Conclusion	I	have	been	pursuing	an	understanding	of	the	role	of	temporality	in	simulations	of	physical	processes	in	complex	systems	by	taking	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	as	an	epitome	and	placing	some	of	their	specific	features	in	parallel	with	what	have	been	seen	as	definitive	characteristics	of	narrative	knowing.	1.)	Most	immediately,	Kendall	Houk’s	stress	on	being	able	to	directly	follow	the	process	of	the	reaction	in	a	movie	correlates	quite	closely	with	Gallie’s	emphasis	on	the	followability	of	a	narrative	through	its	contingencies.	2.)	Repurposing	Gallie’s	account	of	how	explanatory	material	ancillary	to	a	narrative	enhances	followability,	I	find	that	graphical	plots	of	specific	aspects	of	the	reaction,	extending	over	its	full	course	(bonding	distances,	bonding	distance	vs.	time,	velocities,	and	potential	energies)	greatly	enrich	understanding	of	what	the	movies	contain	in	consolidated	form.	3.)	These	same	graphical	plots	appear	to	give	a	clear	picture	of	what	Mink	meant	by	the	synoptic	judgment	and	configurational	comprehension	that	narratives	afford.	The	plots	provide	at	a	glance	overviews	of	the	entire	course	of	the	reaction,	ready	for	retrospective	analysis.	4.)	And	yet	Mink	went	too	far	in	eradicating	temporal	order	from	the	configurational	mode.	Ricoeur	reasserts	the	significance	of	time	in	an	episodic/configurational	dialectic	that	reopens	the	“space	of	contingency”	that	Mink	wanted	to	close.	The	relation	of	episodic	movies	to	configurational	trajectory	plots	in	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	captures	the	point	rather	well.	5.)	Hawthorn	similarly	reopens	the	key	role	of	contingency	in	his	analysis	of	the	
	 34	relation	of	the	actual	to	the	possible	in	the	understanding	that	historical	narratives	provide.	Analogues	for	this	relationship	can	be	seen	for	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	in	the	relation	of	any	single	actual	trajectory	to	the	entire	bundle	of	possible	trajectories	and	in	the	relation	of	the	more	direct	bonding	trajectories	to	those	through	intermediate	formations.		I	conclude	that	understanding	how	simulations	produce	knowledge	about	real	processes	in	complex	systems	benefits	greatly	from	recalling	basic	features	of	narrative	knowing.	I	conclude	also	that	thinking	in	terms	of	a	dialectic	between	following	and	configuring	illuminates	the	role	of	temporality	in	simulations	of	these	processes.		A	final	observation	from	Hawthorn	may	be	helpful.	As	an	illuminating	analogue	to	the	contingency	that	figures	so	prominently	in	historical	narrative,	he	offered	the	unrealized	possibilities	of	biological	evolution	and	the	improbability	of	the	species	we	know	to	exist	today.	This	was	a	topic	much-discussed	by	Stephen	J.	Gould	at	the	time.	Whether	or	not	one	wants	to	go	so	far	as	Gould	in	promoting	the	improbability	of	evolutionary	history,	the	contingency	of	particular	developments	is	apparent.43	The	evolutionary	corollary	has	seemed	quite	appropriate	also	for	the	simulated	natural	histories	of	snowflakes,	and	I	would	extend	it	as	well	to	the	Diels-Alder	reactions.	In	both	cases	it	is	the	capacity	to	follow	a	process	through	its	developmental	history,	or	to	follow	its	growth,	while	simultaneously	learning	to	recognize	diverse	alternative	possibilities,	that	yields	understanding.	
																																																									1	M.	Norton	Wise,	“Science	as	Historical	Narrative,”	Erkenntnis,	75	(2011),	349-376,	special	issue	on	What	Good	is	Historical	Epistemology,	ed.	Uljana	Feest	and	Thomas	Sturm.	I	have	relaxed	here	my	earlier	stress	on	how	simulations	often	“explain”	by	
	 35																																																																																																																																																																						growing	their	product	not	because	I	think	it	mistaken	but	in	order	to	avoid	confusion	with	the	senses	of	explanation	used	by	the	authors	I	cite	below	and	in	order	to	join	it	with	a	broader	conception	of	understanding.	See	n.	7	below.	2	K.	Libbrecht,	Field	Guide	to	Snowflakes	(St.	Paul:	Voyageur	Pr.,	2006).	Many	images	online	at	http://www.its.caltech.edu/~atomic/snowcrystals/	3	Janko	Gravner	and	David	Griffeath,	“Modeling	Snow-Crystal	Growth:	A	Three-Dimensional	Mesoscopic	Approach,”	Physical	Review	E,	79	(2009),	1-18	(color	images	online):	traits,	p.	1;	habits,	p.	17.		4	A	complaint	could	arise	here	that	the	model	of	growth	of	a	snowflake	from	hexagonal	prisms	does	not	represent	a	“true”	or	correct	quantum	mechanical	theory	of	the	interaction	of	water	molecules,	thus	obscuring	truth	even	while	aiding	understanding.	A	possible	response	could	be	that	the	prism	model	with	its	parameters	operates	at	the	mesoscopic	level	and	that	at	that	level	it	aims	to	give	a	true	theoretical	account.	Such	a	response	need	not	invoke	the	idea	of	a	merely	approximately	correct	model;	it	could	insist	instead	on	the	irreducibility	of	the	mesoscopic	description	to	a	microscopic	molecular	one.	An	interesting	possibility	for	such	a	claim	could	be	the	existence	of	quantum	“protectorates,”	or	mesoscopic	domains	in	which	characteristic	features	are	not	sensitive	to	changes	at	the	quantum	mechanical	level,	so	that	the	higher	level	description	is	as	“fundamental”	as	it	gets.	That	is,	there	may	be	nothing	about	snowflakes	considered	macroscopically	that	depends	on	a	microscopic	description.	On	protectorates	and	their	possible	relevance	to	“complex	adaptive	matter”	and	even	evolutionary	diversity	see	Robert	В.	Laughlin	and	David	Pines,	et	al.,	“The	Middle	Way,”	[Electronic	Version],	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	97	(2000),	32-37.	5	The	best	recent	account	of	this	relation	is	Mary	S.	Morgan,	The	World	in	the	Model:	
How	Economists	Work	and	Think	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).	On	simulation	modeling	of	complex	systems	(but	without	narrative)	see	Johannes	Lenhard,	“The	Great	Deluge:	Simulation	Modeling	and	Scientific	Understanding,”	in	Henk	de	Regt,	Sabina	Leonelli,	and	Kai	Eigner	(eds.),	Scientific	Understanding:	
Philosophical	Perspectives	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburg	Press,	2009),	169-186,	and	his	general	analysis	and	survey,	“Computer	Simulation,”	in	Paul	Humphreys	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Philosophy	of	Science	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015),	accessible	from	Oxford	Handbooks	Online	(www.oxfordhandbooks.com).		The	relation	of	models	and	narratives	is	a	theme	of	Angela	N.	H.	Creager,	Elizabeth	Lunbeck,	and	M.	Norton	Wise	(eds.),	Science	without	
Laws:	Model	Systems,	Cases,	Exemplary	Narratives	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2007).		6	Paul	Ricoeur,	Time	and	Narrative,	trans.	Kathleen	McLaughlin	and	David	Pellauer,	3	vols.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1984-1988),	I,	154.	Ricoeur	was	expressing	the	widespread	“Hempelian”	or	“Deductive-Nomological”	conception	of	scientific	explanation	as	requiring	deduction	from	general	laws,	identified	for	historians	with	the	oft-reprinted	paper	by	Carl	G.	Hempel,	“The	Function	of	General	Laws	in	History”	[1942],	in	C.	G.	Hempel	(ed.),	Aspects	of	Scientific	Explanation,	and	
Other	essays	in	the	Philosophy	of	Science	(London:	Macmillan,	1965),	232-243.	Most	
	 36																																																																																																																																																																						of	the	philosophers	of	history	discussed	below	also	understood	“science”	in	this	way.	Despite	its	drawbacks,	it	may	have	sharpened	their	reflections	on	narrative.	7	A	vexed	debate	lurks	here	over	the	meaning	of	understanding	versus	explanation.	I	will	be	attempting	to	lead	discussion	away	from	this	question	and	toward	a	more	liberal	view	of	understanding,	which	does	not	depend	on	the	dichotomy	(this	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	for	several	of	the	authors	I	cite	the	dichotomy	–	typically	in	Hempelian	form	–	was	immediately	present	to	their	thinking	about	narrative).	The	philosophical	literature	on	understanding	in	science	(rather	than	explanation)	is	growing,	but	so	far	it	is	thin	on	what	narrative	has	to	offer.	De	Regt,	et.	al.,	Scientific	
Understanding,	contains	many	useful	articles	on	the	meaning	of	understanding	in	a	wide	variety	of	sciences.	8	Kersey	Black,	Peng	Liu,	Lai	Xu,	Charles	Doubleday,	and	Kendall	N.	Houk,	“Dynamics,	Transition	States,	and	Timing	of	Bond	Formation	in	Diels-Alder	Reactions,”	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	109,	no.	32	(2012),	12860-12865,	on	12860.	http://www.pnas.org/content/109/32/12860.full	9	It	may	be	best	to	use	the	Chrome,	Safari,	or	older	Explorer	browsers,	or	download	to,	e.g.,	Windows	Media	Player.	If	unsuccessful	contact	nortonw@history.ucla.edu.	10	Interview	with	Beth	Azar,	“QnAs	with	Kendall	N.	Houk,”	Proceedings	of	the	
National	Academy	of	Sciences,	109,	no.	32	(2012),	12839.	My	emphasis.	11	W.	B.	Gallie,	Philosophy	and	the	Historical	Understanding	[1964],	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Schocken	Books,	1968),	3.	Gallie,	like	Ricoeur	after	him,	followed	Hempel’s	characterization	of	natural	science	(n.	6).	12	Gallie,	Philosophy,	4.	13	Gallie,	Philosophy,	26.	14	Gallie,	Philosophy,	92-93,	118.	See	also	the	Ricoeur	quotation	of	n.	6.	15	Gallie,	Philosophy,	105.	My	emphasis.	16	All	of	the	figures	are	from	Black,	et.	al.,	“Dynamics”	and	its	Supplementary	Material.	http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1209316109/-/DCSupplemental	17	Black,	et.	al.,	“Dynamics,”	12862.	18	This	understanding	could	of	course	be	wrong,	if	the	simulation	does	not	in	fact	correspond	to	the	actual	dynamics	of	the	reaction,	but	that	is	difficult	to	judge	in	the	absence	of	direct	experimental	confirmation.	The	question	of	validity	then	becomes	one	of	consistency,	whether	with	respect	to	other	experimentally	confirmed	results,	to	the	successful	extension	of	the	results	in	a	chain	of	synthesis,	or	to	theoretical	considerations.	19	Louis	Mink,	“Autonomy	and	the	Historical	Understanding,”	History	and	Theory,	5	(1966),	24-47,	reprinted	in	Louis	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	ed.	Brian	Fay,	I.	O.	Golob,	and	R.	T.	Vann	(Ithaca	and	London:	Cornell	U.	Pr.,	1987),	61-88,	esp.	79.	
	 37																																																																																																																																																																						20	Louis	Mink,	Mind,	History,	and	Dialectic:	The	Philosophy	of	R.	G.	Collingwood	(Bloomington:	Harper	&	Row,	1969),	193.	See	Paul	Roth’s	article	in	this	issue	for	the	significance	of	this	claim	and	his	development	of	it.	21	Mink,	“Autonomy,”	82.	22	Louis	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction	as	Modes	of	Comprehension,”	New	Literary	
History,	1	(1970),	541-548,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	42-60,	on	51-53.		23	Mink	considered	the	different	modes	of	comprehension	to	be	incompatible,	in	the	sense	that	they	could	not	be	combined	in	a	single	act.	He	offered	only	anecdotal	evidence.	He	did	acknowledge	that	one	could	select	different	modes	as	appropriate	to	a	particular	inquiry.	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	551f,	in	Mink,	Historical	
Understanding,	53.	24	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	545,	n.9,	and	546,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	47,	n.	9,	and	48.	25	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	554,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	56.	26	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	554-555,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	56-57.	27	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	549,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	51.	28	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	549-551,	554,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	51-53,	56.	29	Ricoeur,	Time	and	Narrative,	I,	160.	30	Paul	Ricoeur,	“Narrative	Time,”	Critical	Inquiry,	7	(1980),	169-190,	on	178.		31	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	554f,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	57.	32	Louis	Mink,	“Philosophical	Analysis	and	Historical	Understanding,”	in	Mink,	
Historical	Understanding,	118-146,	on	136.	33	Ricoeur,	Time	and	Narrative,	I,	158.	34	The	function	of	these	rerunnings	is	reminiscent	of	work	by	Adam	Toon,	“Playing	with	Molecules,”	Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science,	Part	A,	42	(2011),	580-589,	on	the	way	in	which	chemists	“play”	with	models	of	molecules	in	much	the	same	way	as	children	play	with	dolls	and	trucks	in	games	of	make-believe.	They	learn	the	possibilities	and	constraints	for	the	bonding	of	particular	sorts	of	molecules,	Toon	argues,	through	their	visual	and	tactile	manipulation	of	the	models	and	their	imaginative	participation	with	them,	as	though	they	were	actually	manipulating	the	molecules	themselves.	On	the	importance	of	manipulation	of	models	in	time,	see	also,	Lenhard,	“Great	Deluge,”	170,	178.		35	Geoffrey	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds:	Possibility	and	Understanding	in	history	and	
the	Scocial	Sciences	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991).	I	will	omit	from	my	discussion	one	of	Hawthorn’s	primary	concerns,	with	practical	reasoning,	which	he	often	contrasts	with	causal	reasoning.	My	selection,	while	somewhat	distorting,	focuses	an	aspects	more	relevant	to	the	relation	of	history	to	natural	science.	36	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds	16.	
	 38																																																																																																																																																																						37	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	17,	10,	4.	Nozick	(1981),	12;	Musil	(1979),	12.	I	thank	John	Beatty	for	pointing	me	to	Hawthorn.	See	his	careful	analysis	(this	issue)	of	the	significance	of	alternative	possibilities	for	understanding	and	explanation.		38	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	9.	39	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	16.	40	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	168,	185.	41	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	25.	42	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	169-177,	187.	43	Hawthorn,	Plausible	Worlds,	17f,	n.	19.		
